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ABSTRACT
A redundancy strategy for reducing micrometeroid armor-
ing mass is investigated, with application to cryogenic reactant
storage for a regenerative fuel cell (RFC) on the lunar surface.
In that micrometeoroid environment, the cryogenic fuel must
be protected from loss due to tank puncture. The tankage must
have a sufficiently high probability of survival over the length
of the mission that the probability of system failure due to tank
puncture is low compared to the other mission risk factors.
Assuming that a single meteoroid penetration can cause a stor-
age tank to lose its contents, two means are available to raise
the probability of surviving micrometeoroid attack to the
desired level. One can armor the tanks to a thickness suffi-
cient to reduce probability of penetration of any tank to the
desired level; or add extra capacity, in the form of spare tanks,
that results in survival of a given number out of the ensemble
at the desired level. In this paper a combination of these
strategies (armoring and redundancy) is investigated. The
objective is to find the optimum combination which yields the
lowest shielding mass per cubic meter of surviving fuel out of
the original ensemble.
The investigation found that, for the volumes of fuel
associated with multikilowatt class cryo storage RFC's, and the
armoring methodology and meteoroid models used, storage
should be fragmented into small individual tanks. Larger
installations (more fuel) pay less of a shielding penalty than
small installations. For the same survival probability over the
same time period, larger volumes will require less armoring
mass per unit volume protected.
INTRODUCTION
Construction and operation of a manned lunar base will
require large amounts of liquids and compressed gas to be
stored on-site in a manner that is conveniently accessible yet
reasonably well protected against catastrophic loss. A solar
powered base, for example, will have a regenerative fuel cell
(RFC) that must produce and store large quantities of hydrogen
and oxygen which are subsequently consumed for power dur-
ing the long lunar night. Figure 1 shows a 20 kWe lunar base
power system based on cryogenic reactant storage. This is in
addition to the reactant/propellant stores anticipated for lunar
excursion vehicles (LEV) and fuel cell powered surface rovers,
and water and air storage for environmental control and life
support.
These reactants would be stored in tanks, originally
transported to the site during emplacement. Reactant storage
tanks for the 20 kWe system can be seen in the foreground.
From an emplacement standpoint it is most convenient to
simply place the tanks on the surface in a "tank farm" where
access and interconnection are easy. However, surface
emplacement leaves them exposed to meteoroid attack. On the
other hand, burying or covering the tanks with regolith will
require more site preparation, including excavation, which
means that heavy equipment must be brought to the site
beforehand.
If surface emplacement is chosen, a strategy of protection
against micrometeoroid attack, either by armoring the tanks or
adding spare capacity in the form of redundant tanks, must be
pursued. Given that a certain minimum amount of storage
capacity is required on-site for the entire duration of the
mission, the tank farm architect must choose how many tanks
to partition the reactant inventory into, how much extra inven-
tory will be needed, and how much armoring will be required
to achieve the desired level of protection. Figure 2 illustrates
three possible strategies that could be used, as an example.
The combination of armoring and redundancy that is chosen
will determine the mass penalty that must be paid to ensure
meteoroid survival, which can be compared against the mass
of equipment that would be needed to bury the tanks.
Since this penalty should be reduced to a minimum, it is
desirable to find what combination of armoring and redun-
dancy will yield the minimum armoring mass per unit of pro-
tected (i.e., surviving) storage volume. Storage volume is the
criteria because the stored substance will either be incom-
pressible, or stored under a pressure (tank volume per unit of
mass stored) that is already fixed by critical point considera-
tions or user parameters of the system downstream, and not
within the purview of the tank farm architect.
The problem is treatable by analysis methods similar to
those used for meteoroid armoring of radiators, except that the
quantity of interest is no longer exposed surface area, but the
volume which is enclosed by that exposed surface. The object
is to determine the optimum combination of redundancy and
armoring which minimizes the weight of all tank armoring,
divided by the surviving storage volume.
ANALYSIS
This investigation examined armoring/redundancy strate-
gies in order to find the combination which gives the lowest
armoring mass penalty per unit of protected (i.e., surviving)
storage volume versus the level of protection specified. This
was done by treating the lunar tank farm as an ensemble of N
tanks, of which a given number K would have to survive
meteoroid attack storing the desired quantity of material.
Survival probability (probability of no puncture for K out of N
tanks) depends on the number of tanks exposed, the exposed
surface of each tank, meteoroid flux distribution and the expo-
sure period.
It was assumed that tank failures were independent; that is,
failure of an individual tank does not cause the failure of an
adjacent tank and furthermore, there was no effect of shielding
of individual tank by adjacent tanks. Tanks were assumed to
be spherical and of equal size. To be applicable to both liquid
or pressurized gas storage, only the armoring was considered,
not the container or its contents. This assumes a meteoroid
strike that punctures the armor will also puncture the container
causing it to leak (liquid container) or burst (pressure vessel).
The meteoroid flux was modeled from the near earth flux
distribution shown in Fig. V This flux would be reduced on
the lunar surface by a moon body shielding factor of one half.
An average meteoroid velocity of 20 km/sec was assumed.
Because of their much lower velocity compared to meteoroids,
lunar ejects particles were not considered in the analysis.
Two meteoroid armoring methods were considered:
(1) armoring based on threshold penetration of a single ductile
plate,' (2) threshold penetration of a bumpered wall according
to the method of' which divides the armoring thickness into
to a thin bumper wall and a thicker penetration barrier some
distance behind the bumper. This reference expresses relative
thicknesses and spacing between the bumper and barrier in
terms of the number of "equivalent sphere diameters" of the
penetrating meteoroid which was based on light gas gun data
using aluminum spheres. For purposes of this analysis, the
thickness and spacing relationship that yielded minimum shield
mass per unit area, shown in Fig. 4, was used directly assum-
ing the bumper to wall spacing was small compared to tank
radius so that the effect of tank curvature is negligible.
Bumper to wall spacing of 50 equivalent sphere diameters
(Sl/d = 50) was considered for comparison to single wall
armoring. The armoring material was assumed to be alumi-
num in all cases. The exposure period considered was 7 years.
Table I summarizes the cases that were considered. These
cases were calculated via a step-by-step iterative procedure,
automated through a BASIC computer program that computes
the radius, area, volume, shield thicknesses, and survival
probability of a set of N tanks (K of which must survive) for
any given meteoroid mass. Based on the survival probability
of the N tank ensemble that results, the meteoroid mass can be
either increased or decreased in order to match the desired
meteoroid survival probability. Details of this methodology, as
illustrated in Fig. 5, are presented in Appendix A. Minimum
armoring mass was obtained by exercising this procedure over
the full range of K out of N for each ensemble value N to find
minimum armoring mass cases for each K. Then the lowest
minimum mass case and corresponding K out of N was
selected. These selected cases were compared as shown
below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 6 shows typical results for minimum mass and
"minimum mass K out of N" for 100 cubic meters of surviving
volume (single wall armoring). Specific armoring mass
(armoring mass per unit of protected, i.e., surviving, storage
volume) is plotted against the ensemble number of tanks that
were chosen. Although represented graphically with increasing
N, these data are discrete points not samples of a curve. The
number inscribed in each symbol represents the surviving num-
ber of tanks K out of N which gave minimum armoring mass.
As might be expected, a higher survival probability level
always requires more armoring. But this data illustrates the
incentive for dividing up a fixed volume into many increments,
even though the actual amount of tankage and fuel which must
be emplaced exceeds the original volume by a fraction
(N-K)/N. Similar trends were observed in the other cases
studied (minimum mass and "minimum mass K out of N" for
a given protected volume, survival probability and armoring
method). For example, Fig. 7 shows the same general result
as Fig. 6 when bumpered wall armoring (bumper to wall
spacing S IM = 50) is substituted for single wall armoring.
Note how the armoring mass has decreased. Although
bumpering can dramatically reduce armoring mass, as the
comparison of Fig. 8 shows, it does not appear to change the
armoring mass versus redundancy choice (K out of N).
Similar trends were observed for all the cases (minimum
mass and "minimum mass K out of N" for a given protected
volume and survival probability).
The scaling effects of storage volume on specific armoring
mass should also be mentioned. For a given desired survival
probability, larger storage volumes incur a smaller meteoroid
armoring penalty than small volumes. This is shown in Fig. 9.
There is a beneficial scaling effect when larger volumes are
stored. Reduced to the minimum, specific armoring mass
appears to vary logarithmically with the inverse of volume.
Again, similar trends were observed for the other cases, regard-
less of the survival probability level desired or armoring
method chosen.
CONCLUSIONS
Dividing the protected volume into larger numbers of
smaller tanks reduces armoring mass. Most of the benefit can
be achieved with reasonably small values of N. For example,
desired survival probabilities as high as 0.999 can be obtained
when the ensemble N is 15 to 20 tanks.
The optimum K out of N fraction which minimizes
armoring mass appears to be roughly 0.62 to 0.65 with increas-
ing N. This is a redundancy of about 54 percent. This con-
trasts with the 20 percent mass optimized redundancy/armoring
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minimum reported for flat plate radiator surfaces similarly
exposed.'
Meteoroid armoring scales favorably with size, varying
logarithmically with the inverse of the protected volume.
For all storage volumes considered, and the desired
survival probabilities lying within our range of interest, the
tank armoring/redundancy tradeoff data scale smoothly and
show the same trends regardless of the meteoroid armoring
method that is chosen. When combined with estimates for the
tankage (containment vessel) itself and its contents, the specific
armoring mass data presented herein may be used to estimate
size, distribution and armoring of a tank farm deployed on the
lunar surface.
APPENDIX A
CALCULATIONS AND PROCEDURE
Cases were calculated using the following step-by-step
iterative procedure, beginning with specification of the storage
volume (V) to be protected, the exposure time (T) and the
desired tank ensemble survival probability (Psen). Next, the
number of tanks (N) was selected, determining the volume of
each tank (v = V/N). N may range from 1 to an arbitrarily
selected upper bound (ensembles up to 20 tanks were consid-
ered). The number of tanks (K) required to survive was then
chosen and the radius of each tank was calculated:
r=( 3v
f-333
	 (1)
4n
Next the mass (m) of the micrometeoroid was considered,
from which the corresponding meteoroid flux was calculated
from:'
f = 4.2658 . 10-" m -1.213
(2)(in
	 in gm)
This flux will be reduced by half on the lunar surface, due to
body shielding.
For each meteoroid, the armoring thickness needed to just
stop penetration was calculated, either from:'
th = 0.2588836 m°.J52 (single wall shield)	 (3a)
Calculate diameter of equivalent aluminum sphere
d (in. cm) _	 3 in
4 7r x 2.6989	 (3b)
= 0.8911 M1113
and use minimum mass bumper-wall distribution and spacing
(Fig. 4)
Choose
SIM 50
tl/d=0.07
(t 1 + t2)/d = 0.2972
t2/d = 0.2272
S1 =50d
t1 = 0.07x0.8911 0333 (bumper wall)
t2 = 0.2272 x0.8911 m0333 (main penetration barrier)
which results in:
th = t  + t2 + S1 for the bumpered case.
Then the exposed area of an individual tank was calculated:
	
Ar = 4 7r(r + th)' 	 (4)
and the probability of zero hits for meteoroids greater than in
grams was calculated:
	
Psit = e -0.1 FAfr
	 (5)
where T was the length of the mission (in seconds). The sur-
vival probability of N tanks (k of which must survive) was
given by the Binominal Distribution:
N
	Ps =	 N'	 Psit'(1
	
- Psit)N-t	(6)
The armor mass for the N tanks that results was given by the
individual tank armoring mass:
Mait = 1.333 7r x 2.6989((r + th) 3 _ r3 )	 (7a)
for the single wall case, or from Ref. 5 for a bumpered wall
shield:
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Table A-I.—Armoring/Spares for 100m 3, Survival
Probability = 0.999
Number
of
tanks
Number
of
spares
Relative
shield
mass
Relative
shield
thickness
8 0 320.25 0.140
8 1 104.91 .045
8 2 75.94 .030
8 3 67.96 .024
8 4 68.14 .020
8 5 74.79 .018
8 6 92.43 .017
8 7 145.77 .017
for single walls, or
Mait = 1.333 7rx 2.6989((r + tl + t2 + S1)3 (7b)
- (r + t2 + S 1)3 + (r + t2)' - r'/
for bumpered walls; and by multiplying times the number of
exposed tanks.
be large since all eight tanks must survive. When only one of
eight tanks must survive, the shield thickness can be small, but
the tanks themselves are very large. Minimum shield mass per
unit volume in this case occurs when the system has eight
tanks and three spares.
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Table I.—Lunar Tank Farm Study
Surviving stored 10, 100, and 1000 m3
volumes
Survival probability Seven year survival probability
levels 0.990, 0.995, and 0.999
Ensemble number of From 1, up to 30 tanks
tanks N
Number surviving K From 1, up to N, K selected to
minimize ensemble armoring
mass
Meteoroid flux model NASA SP-8013 near Earth flux
distribution reduced by
50 percent lunar body shield-
ing factor
Armoring methods Single wall, NASA SP-8042 thin
ductile plate (aluminum)
Bumpered wall, NASA CR- 54201,
minimum mass, S IM = 50
A fig , ,!	 .
Figure 1.-20kWe PV/RFC power system for lunar base - - cryogenic
reactant storage (from ref. 1).
Survival Probability t tank 0,999
1 tank, 100 m"3, no spares
Survival Probability any tank = 0.982
-	 -X--	 -	 -
3 tanks, 50 m -3 each, 2 out of 3 surviving
Survival Probability any tank - 0.837
d
25 tanks, 6.67 m -3 each, 15 out of 25 surviving
Figure 2.—Three possible ways to assure 0.999 survival probability
for 100 cubic meters of storage.
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V	 = Projectile velocity
C	 = Shock velocity in solid
S 1 	= Bumper-to-wall separation
D	 = Projectile diameter
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	= Bumper thickness
t 2	= Wall thickness
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Figure 3.—Average cumulative total meteoroid flux-mass
model for 1 A-U. from ref. 3 (NASA SP8013).
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Normalized bumper (t 1 /D) thickness
Figure 4.—Minimum weight two-sheet barrier to prevent pene-
tration (from ref. 5).
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Figure 6.—Single wall armoring, seven year mission, 100
cubic meters surviving.
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Figure 7.— Bumpered wall armoring (S1/d = 50), seven year
mission, 100 cubic meters surviving.
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probability.
Figure 5.—Iterative procedure to compute tank armoring mass and ensemble
survival probability.
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Figure 9.—Bumpered wall armoring (S1 /d = 50), 0.995 survival
probability, seven year mission.
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